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THE ERROR IN APPLYING THE LANGUAGE 
CONDUIT-AGENCY THEORY TO 
INTERPRETERS UNDER THE 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
BY GREGORY J. KLUBOK† 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2001, a trial was held in United States v. Yurofsky,1 a 
federal fraud and money laundering case against two 
defendants.2  In that case, the government decided to use taped 
conversations between the defendants against them at trial.3  
Most of the recorded conversations occurred in Russian, so the 
government obtained an interpreter to put the conversations into 
English.4  The interpreter also created a written transcript of the 
Russian-to-English translation, which defense counsel received.5  
But unbeknownst to the court or the prosecutor, defense counsel 
was fluent in Russian.6  When the government put the 
interpreter on the stand, defense counsel cross-examined the 
interpreter about the accuracy of the translation.7  The judge 
then learned that defense counsel had marked up the translation 
with approximately one hundred corrections, and the judge 
ordered counsel to share those corrections with the government.8   
 
 
 
† Notes & Comments Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., magna cum laude, 
2016, St. John’s University School of Law; B.A., summa cum laude, 2013, Stony 
Brook University. 
1 148 F. Supp. 2d 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 55 F. App’x 13 (2d Cir. 2002). 
2 Yurofsky, 55 F. App’x at 14. 
3 Yurofsky, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 231. 
4 Id. 
5 See id. at 232. 
6 See id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
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Upon further examination, the government agreed with defense 
counsel that approximately eighty of the one hundred identified 
errors were incorrectly translated.9 
What is remarkable about that case is not necessarily that 
the interpreter made mistakes in translating the defendants’ 
statements, but that those mistakes were caught.  The 
interpreter’s mistakes were only revealed because the 
government opted to put the interpreter on the stand, probably 
because the interpreter was the only one who could testify about 
the interpretation.  Interpreters are used in the criminal justice 
system, including during police interrogations, when the suspect 
or defendant does not speak English.10  But in most federal 
courts, interpreters of a defendant’s statements from a police 
interrogation are not subject to the Confrontation Clause, and 
the government is not required to call the interpreter to the 
stand to admit the interpreted statements into evidence if 
someone else can testify about the interpretation.11  These courts 
rely on what is known as the language conduit-agency theory,12 in 
which the interpreter’s statements are imputed to the defendant 
because the interpreter is considered to be an agent of the 
defendant or a language conduit.13  Some courts, though, have 
correctly rejected the application of the language conduit-agency 
theory to interpreters under the Confrontation Clause and have 
held that interpreters who translate at police interrogations are 
subject to the Confrontation Clause.14 
This exclusion of interpreters from the Confrontation Clause 
is contrary to the Confrontation Clause, which states that “[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
9 Id. 
10 See Maxwell Alan Miller et al., Finding Justice in Translation: American 
Jurisprudence Affecting Due Process for People with Limited English Proficiency 
Together with Practical Suggestions, 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 117, 142–47 (2011); 
Beth G. Lindie, Note, Inadequate Interpreting Services in Courts and the Rules of 
Admissibility of Testimony on Extrajudicial Interpretations, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 399, 
420–31 (1993). 
11 See generally United States v. Romo-Chavez, 681 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2012); 
United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Santacruz, 480 F. App’x 441 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Boskovic, 472 F. App’x 
607 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1991). 
12 Although most courts use the term “language conduit theory,” this Note uses 
the phrase “language conduit-agency theory” because courts using the theory 
simultaneously rely on both agency and language conduit principles. 
13 See Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1139; Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 525–28. 
14 See United States v. Charles, 722 F.3d 1319, 1323–25 (11th Cir. 2013). 
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confronted with the witnesses against him.”15  This means that 
defendants in criminal proceedings have the right to cross-
examine the witnesses against them.16  Moreover, even if a 
defendant could subpoena the witnesses against him, the burden 
is on the government, not the defendant, to produce those 
witnesses at trial.17 
There are several reasons why interpreters of a defendant’s 
statements from a police interrogation should be subject to the 
Confrontation Clause.  The language conduit-agency theory 
conflicts with recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on the 
Confrontation Clause.  Moreover, the language conduit-agency 
theory is rooted in hearsay, not the Sixth Amendment.  The 
language conduit-agency theory’s imputation of translated 
statements to the defendant improperly conflates the 
Confrontation Clause with the hearsay rules.  The language 
conduit-agency theory’s use of an agency relationship has no 
basis in agency law.  Finally, the language conduit-agency theory 
improperly relies on the reliability of the interpreter.  Thus, the 
language conduit-agency theory should be rejected as applied to 
the Confrontation Clause.  Therefore, interpreters of a 
defendant’s statements at a police interrogation, like all other 
sources of testimonial statements, should be subject to the 
Confrontation Clause. 
Part I of this Note explains the origins of the Confrontation 
Clause and recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on the topic.  
Part II of this Note explains the current split of authority among 
the United States Courts of Appeals on whether interpreters who 
translate at police interrogations are subject to the Confrontation 
Clause.  Part III of this Note explains why the language conduit-
agency theory is inherently incompatible with the Confrontation 
Clause and why the government should have to call the 
interpreter who translated a defendant’s statements at a police 
interrogation to the stand if it wants to introduce the 
interpreter’s statements into evidence.  Finally, Part IV explains 
how prosecutors can use interpreters at interrogations without 
running afoul of the Confrontation Clause. 
15 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
16 Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315–16 (1974). 
17 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009). 
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I. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
A. Origins and Colonial History 
The roots of the Confrontation Clause can be traced to the 
English common law and British politics before the American 
Revolution.18  Since at least the seventeenth century, English 
commentators commended their country’s open and 
confrontational nature of judicial proceedings, even extending to 
the cross-examination of adverse witnesses.19  This was in stark 
contrast to mainland Europe’s use of the civil-law system, which 
allowed—indeed, relied upon—the private examination of 
witnesses and the reading of such ex parte testimony into the 
record.20 
Confrontation in England gained momentum after the trial 
of Sir Walter Raleigh, who was convicted of treason in 1603.21  
Raleigh had been implicated in treason by Lord Cobham.22  
Officials in England had obtained Cobham’s statements outside 
the presence of Raleigh, and those statements were read into the 
record at trial.23  At trial, Raleigh insisted that Cobham be 
brought before him, stating that he could make Cobham recant 
his implicatory statements.24  The court refused to do so, and 
Raleigh was convicted and sentenced to death.25  Due in part to 
18 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43–47 (2004). 
19 Id. at 45–47. The adversarial nature of English courts, as opposed to civil-law 
courts, was also praised by noted jurist William Blackstone in his Commentaries on 
the Laws of England, in which he noted that the “open examination of witnesses 
viva voce, in the presence of all mankind, is much more conducive to the clearing up 
of truth, than the private and secret examination” of civil-law courts. 3 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 373–74 (Wayne Morrison 
ed., Cavendish Publ’g Ltd. 2001) (1768) (footnote omitted). 
20 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43. 
21 Id. at 44−45. 
22 Id. at 44. 
23 Id.; Michael L. Siegel & Daniel Weisman, The Admissibility of Co-conspirator 
Statements in a Post-Crawford World, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 877, 881 (2007). 
24 Siegel & Weisman, supra note 23. 
25 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44; Allen D. Boyer, The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh: The 
Law of Treason, the Trial of Treason and the Origins of the Confrontation Clause, 74 
MISS. L.J. 869, 889−90 (2005). Although he was given the death sentence, Raleigh 
was not immediately executed. Id. at 895. He spent some time in prison and was 
then given command of an English fleet in 1617 that was charged with finding gold 
in Guiana. Id. The expedition did not find gold, but instead attacked a Spanish 
settlement. Id. Upon return to England, the King put Raleigh on trial before a 
private commission to placate the Spanish. Id. The commission decided to execute 
Raleigh based on the original death sentence from the 1603 trial. Id. 
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the uproar over the conduct of Raleigh’s trial, England soon 
thereafter passed a series of laws that preserved the right of 
confrontation at trial.26 
The Confrontation Clause was added to the United States 
Constitution because the use of such ex parte examinations 
continued at times in the colonies.  After fighting the Seven 
Years’ War, England was faced with a large amount of war 
debts.27  To help pay for this debt, England levied new taxes on 
the colonists.28  One of those taxes was contained in the Sugar 
Act, which taxed sugar imports to the colonies.29  In 1765, 
Parliament passed the Stamp Act, which required all 
newspapers, pamphlets, and legal documents to be on official 
stamped paper.30  Violations of the Stamp Act and the Sugar Act 
were tried in admiralty courts, which were civil-law courts that 
were devoid of many of the protections that defendants enjoyed 
under the common law.31  In admiralty court, the burden of proof 
was on the defendant, not the government.32  There was also no 
right to confrontation in admiralty courts; in fact, admiralty 
courts “routinely took testimony by deposition or private judicial 
examination.”33  Trial in the admiralty courts was met with 
protest in the colonies, partly because there was no right of 
confrontation in the admiralty courts.34  In light of the lack of 
confrontation in pre-Revolutionary times, the Confrontation 
Clause was added to the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution. 
26 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44. 
27 BENJAMIN L. CARP, DEFIANCE OF THE PATRIOTS: THE BOSTON TEA PARTY & 
THE MAKING OF AMERICA 15 (2010). The British national debt almost doubled 
during the Seven Years’ War, and the British victory meant that more money had to 
be used to occupy the newly-won territory in North America. 1 JOHN MURRIN ET AL., 
LIBERTY, EQUALITY, POWER: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 183 (7th ed. 
2016). 
28 ROBERT J. ALLISON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A CONCISE HISTORY 5–11 
(Oxford Univ. Press, Inc. 2011). 
29 MURRIN ET AL., supra note 27, at 185–86. 
30 Id. at 187. 
31 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47–48; 30 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. 
GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 
§ 6345 (West 1977). 
32 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 31. 
33 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47–48. 
34 Id. at 48. Congress, in response to the Stamp Act, protested that “trial by jury 
is the inherent and invaluable right of every British subject in these colonies.” The 
Declaration of the Stamp Act Congress (1765), reprinted in COLONIES TO NATION, 
1763–1789: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 64 (Jack P. 
Greene ed., 1975). 
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B. Recent Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has transformed the 
Confrontation Clause in such a way that makes the language 
conduit-agency theory inherently incompatible with the 
Confrontation Clause.  The Confrontation Clause was 
incorporated into constitutional jurisprudence in 1965 with 
Pointer v. Texas.35  Prior to 2004, the leading case on the 
Confrontation Clause was Ohio v. Roberts.36  Under Roberts and 
its progeny, statements from an unavailable witness that were 
deemed to have “adequate indicia of reliability” or that fell under 
a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” satisfied the Confrontation 
Clause even though the defendant never confronted the 
declarant.37  But in Bourjaily v. United States,38 the Court eroded 
the requirement that the witness be unavailable, instead 
focusing on the reliability of the statements.39  Until 2004, it was 
this Roberts test that was used by courts in analyzing the 
Confrontation Clause. 
But the Roberts test was rejected by Crawford v. 
Washington40 and its progeny, which have revolutionized the 
Confrontation Clause in recent years.  In Crawford, the 
defendant was convicted of assault after he stabbed a man.41  
During their investigation of this assault, police officers 
interrogated the defendant’s wife, who gave an account of the 
stabbing.42  At trial, the defendant’s wife did not testify due to the 
marital privilege, but in Washington, the marital privilege does 
not extend to a spouse’s statements that would be admissible 
under an exception to the hearsay rules.43  In that case, the 
defendant’s wife helped to organize the assault, so her 
statements were admitted as statements against interest.44  The  
 
 
 
35 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). 
36 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
37 Id. at 66 (internal quotation omitted); see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60. 
38 483 U.S. 171 (1987). 
39 Id. at 182–84. 
40 541 U.S. 36. 
41 Id. at 38, 41. 
42 Id. at 39–40. 
43 Id. at 40. 
44 Id. 
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defendant then claimed that his Confrontation Clause rights 
were violated because the government did not call his wife to the 
stand.45 
The Supreme Court agreed with the defendant.  Reinforcing 
that the Confrontation Clause applies to both in-court and out-of-
court statements,46 the Court held that all testimonial statements 
fell within the scope of the Confrontation Clause.47  The Supreme 
Court also rejected the notion that the Confrontation Clause 
could be satisfied through admissibility under the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, stating that “we do not think the Framers meant to 
leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the 
rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of 
‘reliability.’ ”48  The Supreme Court rejected the Roberts test, 
stating that it did not provide “any meaningful protection.”49  The 
Court held that although the Confrontation Clause does promote 
the reliability of evidence, it mandates “that reliability be 
assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of 
cross-examination.”50  Noting that statements elicited through 
police interrogation are testimonial, the Supreme Court held that 
the admission of the defendant’s wife’s testimony without the 
government calling her to the stand violated the Confrontation 
Clause.51 
The Supreme Court did not provide a definition of 
testimonial in Crawford.  The Court waited until Davis v. 
Washington52 to do so.  In that case, the Court stated: 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of 
police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating 
that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police 
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.  They are testimonial 
when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no  
 
 
 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 50–51. 
47 Id. at 59. 
48 Id. at 61. 
49 Id. at 68. 
50 Id. at 61. 
51 Id. at 68–69 (“Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of 
reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution 
actually prescribes: confrontation.”). 
52 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
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such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially 
relevant to later criminal prosecution.53 
Accordingly, any statements made during a police interrogation, 
when the information elicited is not used to respond to an active 
emergency, are testimonial.54 
Five years after Crawford, the Supreme Court decided 
another Confrontation Clause case, Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts.55  In Melendez-Diaz, the defendant was charged 
with distributing cocaine.56  As part of the evidence against the 
defendant, the police seized nineteen plastic bags of cocaine that 
the defendant and his accomplices tried to hide in a police car.57  
Those bags were submitted to a state lab to conduct tests.58 
At trial, the government offered the bags into evidence with 
three certificates of analysis, which stated that the bags, as 
shown by a forensic analysis, contained cocaine.59  The defendant 
objected to the certificates, arguing that allowing the certificates 
into evidence without having the lab technician who conducted 
the forensic analysis on the stand would violate the 
Confrontation Clause, particularly in light of Crawford.60  The 
objection was overruled, and the defendant was convicted.61 
The Supreme Court agreed with the defendant, holding that 
the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause were 
violated when the certificates of analysis were admitted into 
evidence without putting the lab technician on the stand.62  As an 
initial matter, the Supreme Court noted that the certificates of 
analysis were testimonial.63  Testimonial statements can include 
affidavits, depositions, and prior testimony.64  Although called  
 
 
 
53 Id. at 822. 
54 Id.; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. 
55 557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
56 Id. at 308. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 309. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 329. 
63 Id. at 310. 
64 Id. 
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certificates of analysis, they were akin to affidavits because they 
contained sworn-to statements of fact.65  Thus, these certificates 
of analysis were subject to the Confrontation Clause.66 
The government made several arguments, all rejected by the 
Court, worth mentioning.  The government argued that the 
Confrontation Clause did not apply because the certificates of 
analysis themselves were not accusatory, but only became 
relevant when viewed with the other evidence.67  The Supreme 
Court rejected that argument, noting that nothing in the Sixth 
Amendment necessitates that the evidence be accusatory, only 
that the witness be against the defendant.68  There, the lab 
technician, by virtue of his certificate of analysis, became a 
witness against the defendant, implicating the Confrontation 
Clause.69 
The government also claimed that the certificates of analysis 
satisfied the Confrontation Clause because the certificates were 
the “resul[t] of neutral, scientific testing.”70  The Supreme Court 
stated that that was a return to the Roberts test, the “since-
rejected theory that unconfronted testimony was admissible so 
long as it bore indicia of reliability.”71  Thus, the fact that the 
certificates of analysis and the testing may have been reliable is 
of no relevance to the Confrontation Clause.72 
The government also had an argument based on judicial 
economy.  The government argued that it would be too 
burdensome to always call the lab technician to the stand 
whenever some sort of forensic analysis was conducted in a 
criminal case.73  But the Court rejected that argument too, noting 
that “[t]he Confrontation Clause may make the prosecution of 
criminals more burdensome, but that is equally true of the right  
 
 
 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 313. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 317 (alteration in original). 
71 Id. at 312, 317. 
72 See id. at 317–18. 
73 Id. at 325. 
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to trial by jury and the privilege against self-incrimination.”74  
The Court could not disregard the Confrontation Clause because 
it was convenient to do so.75 
Finally, in Bullcoming v. New Mexico,76 the Supreme Court 
dealt with surrogate testimony under the Confrontation Clause.  
Surrogate testimony is when someone familiar with the policies 
and procedures of a process, but who did not actually conduct the 
process at issue, testifies about that process.77  In Bullcoming, the 
defendant was charged with aggravated driving while intoxicated 
(“DWI”) after failing field sobriety tests.78  Since the defendant 
refused to submit to a breathalyzer test, the police obtained a 
warrant to conduct a blood alcohol test.79  After the defendant’s 
blood was drawn at a hospital, it was sent to a laboratory for 
analysis, where it was revealed that the defendant’s blood alcohol 
concentration (“BAC”) was 0.21, well over the legal limit.80 
At trial, the government stated that it would not be calling 
the analyst who actually performed the analysis of defendant’s 
blood because the analyst had been placed on unpaid leave.81  
Instead, the government stated that it would put another analyst 
on the stand who could testify about the general policies and 
procedures of the laboratory.82  Defense counsel objected, arguing 
that such surrogate testimony would violate the defendant’s 
rights under the Confrontation Clause.83  The objection was 
overruled, and the defendant was convicted of aggravated DWI.84 
The Supreme Court held that such surrogate testimony 
violated the Confrontation Clause, overruling the New Mexico 
Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court rejected the analysis of its 
New Mexico counterpart that there was no Confrontation Clause 
violation because the analyst merely “transcribed” information 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
77 Id. at 2710. 
78 Id. at 2710, 2711. 
79 Id. at 2710. 
80 Id. at 2710–11. In New Mexico, it is illegal to operate a motor vehicle with a 
BAC of .08 or higher. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102 (West 2010). Because the 
defendant’s BAC was at or higher than .16, the defendant was charged with 
aggravated DWI. Id. 
81 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2711–12. 
82 Id. at 2712. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
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from a machine used to analyze the defendant’s blood.85  The 
Supreme Court noted that surrogate testimony could not show 
what exactly the lab technician did to test the blood or show any 
errors in the testing process.86  The Supreme Court held that 
when the results of the test performed by the lab technician were 
introduced, the lab technician who actually conducted those tests 
became a witness against the defendant, thus implicating the 
Confrontation Clause.87 
There are a few concepts that are clear from the Supreme 
Court’s recent jurisprudence on the Confrontation Clause.  First, 
statements elicited during police interrogations, when there is no 
ongoing emergency to respond to, are testimonial.88  Second, there 
is no reliability exception to the Confrontation Clause.89  No 
matter how reliable some testimonial statements may be, they 
are still subject to the Confrontation Clause.90  Even if the 
declarant is a neutral person with no interest in the litigation, 
the defendant still has the right to cross-examine the declarant.91  
Third, surrogate testimony does not satisfy the Confrontation 
Clause.92  Fourth, the Confrontation Clause is separate from the 
rules of evidence.93  Unfortunately, the courts that apply the 
language conduit-agency theory to interpreters under the 
Confrontation Clause ignore these concepts. 
II. TRANSLATOR TESTIMONY AND CONFRONTATION: THE CIRCUIT 
SPLIT 
A. The Ninth Circuit and the Majority View 
Most circuit courts that have faced the question of whether 
interpreters’ statements from police interrogations are subject to 
the Confrontation Clause have held that they are not.  The most 
aggressive circuit in holding that interpreters who translate a 
defendants’ statements during police interrogations are not 
subject to the Confrontation Clause is the United States Court of 
85 Id. at 2714, 2715 (quoting State v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1, 8 (N.M. 2010)). 
86 Id. at 2715. 
87 Id. at 2716. 
88 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004). 
89 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 317–18 (2009). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 318–19. 
92 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715–16. 
93 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. 
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Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, whose jurisprudence on the 
application of the language conduit-agency theory to the 
Confrontation Clause dates back to the 1991 case of United 
States v. Nazemian.94  Nazemian was the first case to apply the 
language conduit-agency theory, which had previously only been 
used to get around the hearsay rules,95 to the Confrontation 
Clause.  Under the language conduit-agency theory, the 
translator is considered to be a language conduit or agent of the 
defendant, so the translator’s statements are imputed to the 
defendant.96  Since the defendant cannot cross-examine himself, 
there is no Confrontation Clause issue.97 
Nazemian and subsequent cases utilized four factors to 
determine if a translator was acting as an agent or language 
conduit of the defendant.  The four factors from Nazemian are 
(1) the party that supplied the translator; (2) whether the 
interpreter had a motive to lie; (3) the interpreter’s language 
expertise; and (4) “whether actions subsequent to the 
conversation were consistent with the statements as 
translated.”98  The fact that the government is the party 
supplying the translator, though, does not automatically preclude 
the translator from being an agent of the defendant.99  Those 
factors answer the initial question, according to the Ninth 
Circuit, of whether the interpreter’s statements can be imputed 
to the defendant under the language conduit-agency theory.100 
Crawford v. Washington101 and its progeny have not changed 
the Ninth Circuit’s application of the language conduit-agency 
theory to the Confrontation Clause.  In a post-Crawford case, 
United States v. Orm Hieng,102 the Ninth Circuit reiterated its 
94 948 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1991). The Fourth and Fifth Circuits have also adopted 
the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the language conduit-agency theory as applied 
to the Confrontation Clause. See United States v. Shibin, 722 F.3d 233, 248–49 (4th 
Cir. 2013); United States v. Budha, 495 F. App’x 452, 454 (5th Cir. 2012). 
95 See United States v. Ushakow, 474 F.2d 1244, 1245 (9th Cir. 1973). 
96 United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that 
if the language conduit-agency theory applies, “the defendant cannot claim that he 
was denied the opportunity to confront himself”); Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 527–28. 
97 Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1139. 
98 Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 527; Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1139. 
99 United States v. Romo-Chavez, 681 F.3d 955, 959–60 (9th Cir. 2012); United 
States v. Santacruz, 480 F. App’x 441, 442–43 (9th Cir. 2012); Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 
527–28. 
100 Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 527. 
101 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
102 679 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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application of the language conduit-agency theory to the 
Confrontation Clause and decided that Crawford and its progeny 
did not necessitate a change in such application.103  The Ninth 
Circuit in Orm Hieng concluded that Crawford and its progeny 
only require confrontation of the person who made the 
statement.104  Under the language conduit-agency theory, the 
statement is imputed to the defendant, who cannot cross-
examine himself.105  The court in Orm Hieng further held that 
Crawford and its progeny never addressed the question of 
whether a translator is the declarant under the language 
conduit-agency theory, or even whether the language conduit-
agency theory applies.106  The court concluded that it “can apply 
Nazemian without running afoul of Crawford.”107 
Significantly, Nazemian and subsequent Ninth Circuit cases 
are unclear and ambiguous in explaining whether they are 
holding that an interpreter is a language conduit or an agent of 
the defendant, or both.  Whichever rationale the Ninth Circuit 
has used, there is no basis for the interpreter to be either a 
language conduit or an agent of the defendant.108  Nazemian’s 
reference to the “agency-language conduit theory” only adds to 
such ambiguity.109  Indeed, after finding that there was no 
Confrontation Clause issue, the Ninth Circuit in Nazemian held 
that it was not erroneous for the United States District Court for 
the Central District of California to consider the translator as a 
language conduit or an agent, without explaining which one, or 
both, applied.110  The Ninth Circuit then stated that since the 
interpreter was a language conduit or agent of the defendant, 
there was no Confrontation Clause issue.111 
Two more post-Crawford Ninth Circuit cases that were 
decided within two months of each other show the inability of 
that circuit to clearly explain whether the interpreter is a 
103 Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1139–40 (9th Cir. 2012). 
104 Id. at 1140. 
105 Id. at 1139. 
106 Id. at 1140. 
107 Id. 
108 See infra Part III. 
109 United States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 526 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting 
United States v. Felix-Jerez, 667 F.2d 1297, 1300 n.1 (9th Cir. 1982)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
110 Id. at 528. 
111 Id. 
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language conduit or agent of the defendant, or both.  In United 
States v. Boskovic,112 the Ninth Circuit, in applying the language 
conduit-agency theory, only used the term “language conduit.”113  
The words agent and agency as applied to the language conduit-
agency theory were nowhere to be found in that case.114  But less 
than two months later, in United States v. Santacruz,115 the Ninth 
Circuit held that there was no Confrontation Clause issue 
because the interpreter was a language conduit or agent of the 
defendant—once again, without explaining which one, or both, 
applied.116  That case, like the other Ninth Circuit cases on the 
issue, did not contain any sort of analysis using the principles of 
agency.117 
Significantly, no Ninth Circuit case has ever decided whether 
interpreters’ statements from pretrial interrogations are 
testimonial.118  Instead, the Ninth Circuit has avoided the 
question by holding that, as a preliminary matter, there is no 
Confrontation Clause issue because the statements belong to the 
defendant under the language conduit-agency theory.119 
B. The Eleventh Circuit Creates a Circuit Split 
The language conduit-agency theory as applied to the 
Confrontation Clause was rejected for the first time in United 
States v. Charles.120  In that case, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected the language conduit-
agency theory because interpreters do not translate word-for-
word, but rather translate ideas and concepts, so the defendant 
and the translator had different statements.121  Moreover, 
112 472 F. App’x 607 (9th Cir. 2012). 
113 Id. at 608. 
114 See id. 
115 480 F. App’x 441 (9th Cir. 2012). 
116 Id. at 443. 
117 See generally United States v. Romo-Chavez, 681 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2012); 
United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Santacruz, 480 F. App’x 441 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Boskovic, 472 F. App’x 
607 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1991). 
118 See generally Romo-Chavez, 681 F.3d at 955; Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1131; 
Santacruz, 480 F. App’x at 441; Boskovic, 472 F. App’x at 607; Nazemian, 948 F.2d 
at 522. 
119 See generally Romo-Chavez, 681 F.3d at 955; Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1131; 
Santacruz, 480 F. App’x at 441; Boskovic, 472 F. App’x at 607; Nazemian, 948 F.2d 
at 522. 
120 722 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2013). 
121 Id. at 1324. 
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colloquial expressions and differences in dialect make translation 
all the more difficult.122  Because the statements of the defendant 
and the interpreter differed, the interpreter was not a language 
conduit.123  The Eleventh Circuit also found that the interpreter’s 
statements were testimonial because they were elicited during a 
police interrogation.124  Since the statements were testimonial 
and the language conduit-agency theory did not apply, the 
interpreter was subject to the Confrontation Clause.125 
The government in Charles urged the court to adopt the 
language conduit-agency theory as per the Eleventh Circuit’s 
prior reasoning in United States v. Alvarez.126  The Eleventh 
Circuit in Alvarez, analyzing the hearsay rules, used the 
language conduit-agency theory to make a translator’s 
statements party-opponent statements under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 801(d)(2)(C) or (D).127  But Alvarez did not discuss the 
Confrontation Clause.128 
Using Alvarez, the Eleventh Circuit in Charles pointed out 
that the language conduit-agency theory does not assume that 
the defendant was the declarant.129  The Charles court noted that 
had the court in Alvarez viewed the defendant as the declarant, 
the statements would have been admitted under Federal Rule 
Evidence 801(d)(2)(A) as party-opponent statements, and the 
court would not have had to go to Federal Rule of Evidence 
801(d)(2)(C) or (D) for statements authorized by a party or 
statements by a party’s agent.130  Finally, the Eleventh Circuit 
reasoned that even if translators’ statements can be considered 
reliable, Crawford specifically rejected reliability as a test under 
the Confrontation Clause.131  Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit 
rejected the language conduit-agency theory’s viability under the 
Confrontation Clause.132  Because statements of a defendant 
taken during police interrogations are testimonial, the Eleventh 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 1323. 
125 Id. 
126 755 F.2d 830 (11th Cir. 1985). 
127 Id. at 859–60. 
128 Charles, 722 F.3d at 1325. 
129 See id. at 1326. 
130 Id. at 1326–27. 
131 Id. at 1327–28. 
132 Id. at 1330–31. 
FINAL_KLUBOK 6/21/2016 3:54 PM 
1414 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:1399   
Circuit held that any interpreted statements taken during a 
police interrogation are also deemed testimonial.133  The Eleventh 
Circuit thus held that the interpreter who interpreted during the 
police interrogation was subject to the Confrontation Clause.134 
III. THE LANGUAGE CONDUIT-AGENCY THEORY IS INCONSISTENT 
WITH THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
There are several reasons why the language conduit-agency 
theory should be rejected as applied to the Confrontation Clause 
when a defendant’s statements from a police interrogation are 
being offered into evidence.  First, as an initial matter, the 
Supreme Court has held that statements from police 
interrogations are testimonial, so those statements fall within 
the scope of the Confrontation Clause.  Second, the language 
conduit-agency theory’s use of an agency relationship has no 
basis in agency law.  Third, the language conduit-agency theory’s 
imputation of statements from an interpreter to a defendant 
comes from the hearsay rules and has no basis in the 
Confrontation Clause.  Finally, the language conduit-agency 
theory improperly relies on reliability.  Thus, interpreters who 
translate a defendant’s statements at a police interrogation 
should be subject to the Confrontation Clause if the government 
wants to introduce the interpreter’s statements into evidence. 
A. Interpreters’ Statements Are Testimonial 
The Eleventh Circuit in Charles was correct to hold that a 
defendant’s interpreted statements from a police interrogation 
are testimonial.  A statement is “testimonial when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no . . . emergency, 
and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish 
or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.”135  Testimonial statements, “at a minimum,” include 
statements taken at police interrogations.136  Interpreters are 
often used during police interrogations,137  and statements 
elicited during police interrogations are “testimonial under even 
133 Id. at 1323. 
134 Id. at 1330–31. 
135 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). 
136 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). 
137 See Lindie, supra note 10; Miller et al., supra note 10. 
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a narrow standard.”138  In such an interrogation, there is no 
ongoing emergency that the police need to respond to.  Indeed, 
the sole purpose of such an interrogation is to gather evidence for 
a criminal prosecution.  Moreover, statements need not be 
accusatory to be subject to the Confrontation Clause.139  
Therefore, statements taken by interpreters during pretrial 
police interrogations are testimonial. 
In defense of the language conduit-agency theory, the Ninth 
Circuit has inferred that one reason why interpreters are not 
subject to the Confrontation Clause is that they are reliable, 
noting that interpreters have no “motive to mistranslate.”140  
Reliability was the old test used in Ohio v. Roberts.141  But such a 
reliability test for the Confrontation Clause has been expressly 
rejected, several times, by the Supreme Court.142  In Crawford v. 
Washington,143  the Supreme Court, in rejecting the Roberts test, 
stated that “we do not think the Framers meant to leave the 
Sixth Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of 
evidence, much less to amorphous notions of ‘reliability.’ ”144 
The Supreme Court was even more explicit in  
Melendez-Diaz, noting that the Roberts test used the  
“since-rejected theory that unconfronted testimony was 
admissible so long as it bore indicia of reliability.”145  The Court in 
Melendez-Diaz held that even though scientific testimony may be 
neutral, and forensic analysts have no personal interest in the 
outcome of the case, such testimony is subject to the 
Confrontation Clause.146  The Court held that confrontation could 
expose an expert with a “lack of proper training or deficiency in 
judgment.”147  Similarly here, even though interpreters may be 
neutral, they should still be subject to the Confrontation Clause, 
138 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. 
139 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 313 (2009). Statements are 
not accusatory if they do not make direct accusations of criminality against the 
defendant, but only inculpate the defendant when taken in conjunction with other 
evidence. Id. 
140 See United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012). 
141 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
142 See supra Part I.B. 
143 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
144 Id. at 61. 
145 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 312 (2009) (citing Roberts, 
448 U.S. at 66). 
146 Id. at 317. 
147 Id. at 320. 
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and confrontation may expose interpreters who mistranslate 
defendants’ statements.  Thus, even if it were to be assumed that 
interpreters are reliable, that is of no consequence under the 
Confrontation Clause. 
The Confrontation Clause issue arises here because the 
interpreter who interpreted a defendant’s statements at a police 
interrogation is not called to testify.  Instead, a third party who 
happens to be present during the translation, usually a member 
of law enforcement, testifies as to what the interpreter 
translated.148  That is essentially what surrogate testimony is.149  
But, as noted above, the Supreme Court in Bullcoming held that 
surrogate testimony does not satisfy the Confrontation Clause.150  
Since the translator is the one that is doing the translating, it is 
that translator, and not anyone else, who must testify.151 
Simply put, translated statements of defendants from police 
interrogations are being elicited for the sole purpose of future 
criminal prosecution; thus, they are testimonial.  Finding that 
interpreted statements from pretrial interrogations are subject to 
the Confrontation Clause “involves little more than the 
application of [the Supreme Court’s] holding in Crawford v. 
Washington” and subsequent cases.152 
B. The Language Conduit-Agency Theory Is a Perversion of 
Agency Law 
One main point of the language conduit-agency theory is 
that the interpreter is treated as an agent of the defendant, so 
there is no Confrontation Clause issue.153  Despite this, no Ninth 
Circuit case involving the language conduit-agency theory has 
ever discussed agency law,154 perhaps because the language 
conduit-agency theory’s use of agency has no basis in agency law.  
148 See United States v. Shibin, 722 F.3d 233, 238–39 (4th Cir. 2013); United 
States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1136, 1138–39 (9th Cir. 2012). 
149 See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011). 
150 See supra Part I.B. 
151 See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2716. 
152 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 329. 
153 Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1139; United States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 528 
(9th Cir. 1991). 
154 See generally United States v. Romo-Chavez, 681 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2012); 
Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1131; United States v. Santacruz, 480 F. App’x 441 (9th Cir. 
2012); United States v. Boskovic, 472 F. App’x 607 (9th Cir. 2012); Nazemian, 948 
F.2d at 522. 
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Agency is “a consensual relationship in which one person . . . acts 
as a representative of or otherwise acts on behalf of another 
person with power to affect the legal rights and duties of the 
other person.  The person represented has a right to control the 
actions of the agent.”155  However, the language conduit-agency 
theory fails to satisfy several essential elements of an agency 
relationship. 
First, one of the requirements of an agency relationship is 
that the principal must manifest his assent to the agency 
relationship.156  Indeed, the requirement of manifestation is part 
of the definition of agency.157  Significantly, “[a] manifestation 
does not occur in a vacuum, and the meaning that may 
reasonably be inferred from it will reflect the context in which 
the manifestation is made.”158 
When a defendant is being interrogated by law enforcement, 
there is absolutely no manifestation by the defendant that he 
consents to the agency relationship.  The defendant has been 
arrested or is a person of interest in a criminal investigation, and 
the interpreter just so happens to be present at the interrogation.  
The defendant was not the person who requested the interpreter; 
law enforcement did.  The defendant in such a situation did not 
do anything to manifest his acceptance of an agency relationship.  
And merely allowing the interpreter to translate cannot possibly 
be a manifestation of assent, as it is black-letter law that only the 
acts of the principal, not of the agent, may bind the principal and 
agent together.159 
Another basic element of an agency relationship is that the 
agent be subject to the principal’s control.160  The ability of the 
principal to control the agent is part of the very definition of an 
155 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c (2006). 
156 Id. § 1.01; Ramos-Barrientos v. Bland, 661 F.3d 587, 600 (11th Cir. 2011); 
Cleveland v. Caplaw Enters., 448 F.3d 518, 522 (2d Cir. 2006). 
157 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. d (2006). 
158 Id. § 1.03. 
159 Velasco v. Gov’t of Indon., 370 F.3d 392, 400 n.3 (4th Cir. 2004); Auvil v. 
Grafton Homes, Inc., 92 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[There is a] well-established 
tenet that an agent cannot create his own authority to represent a principal.”); Kuhn 
v. City of New York, 274 N.Y. 118, 134, 8 N.E.2d 300, 306 (1937). 
160 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c (2006); Kawasaki Kisen 
Kaisha, Ltd. v. Plano Molding Co., 696 F.3d 647, 652 (7th Cir. 2012); Atrium of 
Princeton, LLC v. N.L.R.B., 684 F.3d 1310, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Jurgens v. Poling 
Transp. Co., 113 F. Supp. 2d 388, 399 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (referring to control as “[t]he 
most critical element” in an agency relationship). 
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agency relationship.161  Indeed, without the ability of the 
principal to control the agent, no agency relationship exists.162  
When looking at the element of control, courts look at the right of 
the principal to control the agent, not actual control.163 
When being interrogated by law enforcement, the defendant 
cannot exercise control over the interpreter.  The defendant 
cannot tell the interpreter to leave the room or not to translate 
something.  If law enforcement officers are conversing amongst 
themselves on a matter that they do not want the interpreter to 
translate for the defendant, the defendant cannot order the 
interpreter to translate it anyway.  Simply put, the interpreter in 
such a situation is controlled by law enforcement, not the 
defendant.  Thus, without the ability of the defendant to control 
the interpreter, “there is no agency relationship.”164 
Lastly, there is no agency relationship between an 
interpreter and a defendant because the interpreter does not 
have the power to alter the legal relationship between the 
principal and third parties.  The ability of an agent to do so is one 
of the “essential characteristics” of the agency relationship.165  
The ability to alter the legal relationship between the principal 
and third parties means that the agent can “(1) bind the principal 
in contract with a third person; (2) divest the principal of interest 
in a thing, such as selling the principal’s goods to a third person; 
(3) acquire new interests for the principal; or (4) subject the 
principal to tort liability by injuring a third person.”166 
As between an interpreter and a defendant, the interpreter 
cannot alter the legal relationship between the principal and 
third parties.  The interpreter cannot enter into a contract on 
161 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 
S. Ct. 2652, 2666 (2013); In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 390 F. Supp. 2d 319, 330 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
162 Spagnola v. Chubb Corp., 264 F.R.D. 76, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Bowoto v. 
Chevron Texaco Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1239 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
163 In re Coupon Clearing Serv., Inc., 113 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 1997); 
Alkanani v. Aegis Def. Servs., LLC, 976 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2013); A.P.I. Inc. 
Asbestos Settlement Trust v. Home Ins. Co., 877 F. Supp. 2d 709, 722 (D. Minn. 
2012). 
164 In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 390 F. Supp. 2d at 330. 
165 Prof’l Commc’ns, Inc. v. Contract Freighters, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 546, 551 
(D. Md. 2001); see also BancOklahoma Mortg. Corp. v. Capital Title Co., 194 F.3d 
1089, 1104 (10th Cir. 1999); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 12 (1958). 
166 Eyerman v. Mary Kay Cosmetics, Inc., 967 F.2d 213, 220 (6th Cir. 1992); see 
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 12 cmt. a (1958). 
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behalf of the defendant with a third party, divest the principal of 
interest in property, acquire new property for the principal, or 
subject the principal to tort liability.  There is simply no way for 
the interpreter to change the legal relationship between the 
defendant and third parties.  The only thing the interpreter does 
is interpret, which does not change the legal relationship 
between the defendant and any third parties.  Thus, the 
interpreter cannot be an agent of the defendant. 
Even if the elements of an agency relationship were to be 
disregarded, the interpreter would be breaching his duty to the 
defendant because agents have “a duty not to deal with the 
principal as or on behalf of an adverse party in a transaction 
connected with the agency relationship.”167  Indeed, an agency 
relationship is a fiduciary relationship, and the agent owes the 
principal a duty of good faith.168  Acting on behalf of an adverse 
party generally violates this duty of good faith.169 
When an interpreter is being used at a pretrial interrogation 
to translate the defendant’s words into English, the interpreter is 
acting on behalf of law enforcement.  The defendant did not bring 
the interpreter to the interrogation; law enforcement did.  And 
since law enforcement is presumably investigating a crime that 
the defendant was a suspect in, and later becomes prosecuted for, 
law enforcement is adverse to the defendant.  This is inherently 
inconsistent with agency law.  If the interpreter, as the language 
conduit-agency theory suggests,170 is an agent of the defendant, 
then the interpreter is breaching his duty of good faith by acting 
on behalf of an adverse party.  If the interpreter is the 
defendant’s agent for the purposes of translation, then the 
transaction—that is, the translation—is voidable at the  
 
 
167 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.03 (2006); see also Robertson v. 
Chapman, 152 U.S. 673, 681–82 (1894); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 
926, 934 (10th Cir. 1954). 
168 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006); Tow v. Amegy Bank N.A., 
976 F. Supp. 2d 889, 903 (S.D. Tex. 2013); UBS AG, Stamford Branch v. 
HealthSouth Corp., 645 F. Supp. 2d 135, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
169 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.03 (2006); UBS AG, Stamford Branch, 
645 F. Supp. 2d at 144; Select Creations, Inc. v. Paliafito Am., Inc., 911 F. Supp. 
1130, 1153–54 (E.D. Wis. 1995). 
170 See supra Part II.A. 
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defendant’s option.171  This means that, if the interpreter was the 
defendant’s agent, the defendant could simply void the 
translation. 
The relationship between an interpreter and a defendant is 
inherently inconsistent with an agency relationship.  Some of the 
elements of an agency relationship are absent, and even if they 
were present, the interpreter would be violating his duty to the 
defendant, the principal, by acting on behalf of law enforcement.  
Thus, an interpreter appearing on behalf of law enforcement 
cannot possibly be an agent of the defendant. 
C. The Language Conduit-Agency Theory Improperly Conflates 
the Confrontation Clause with the Hearsay Rules 
The whole premise of the language conduit-agent theory is 
that because the statements of an interpreter can be imputed to 
the defendant, there is no Confrontation Clause issue because the 
defendant cannot cross-examine himself.172  But this whole 
concept of imputation exists under the hearsay rules, not the 
Confrontation Clause.  Essentially, the language conduit-agency 
theory holds that there is no Confrontation Clause issue if the 
statement would be a party-opponent statement under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2).  In applying the language conduit-
agency theory to the Confrontation Clause, the Ninth Circuit has 
improperly conflated the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay 
rules. 
This conflation is apparent from the language of United 
States v. Nazemian.173  The court there stated that, as a 
preliminary matter under the Confrontation Clause, it had to 
decide whether the defendant or the interpreter was the 
speaker.174  The court noted that “[t]his threshold question 
likewise controls the hearsay analysis.  If the statements are 
viewed as [the defendant’s] own, they would constitute 
admissions properly characterized as non-hearsay under [Federal 
171 See Television Events & Mktg., Inc. v. AMCON Distrib. Co., 488 F. Supp. 2d 
1071, 1078–79 (D. Haw. 2006); Hidden Brook Air, Inc. v. Thabet Aviation Int’l Inc., 
241 F. Supp. 2d 246, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. Ticor Title 
Ins. Co., 873 F. Supp. 718, 727 (D. Mass. 1995). 
172 United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012); United 
States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 528 (9th Cir. 1991). 
173 948 F.2d 522. 
174 Id. at 525. 
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Rule of Evidence] 801(d)(2)(C) or (D).”175  The court then found 
that because the interpreter’s statements could be imputed to the 
defendant, the statements were admissible under both the 
hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause.176 
Post-Nazemian jurisprudence from the Ninth Circuit further 
shows the conflation of the hearsay rules and the Confrontation 
Clause in the language conduit-agency theory.  In United States v. 
Romo-Chavez,177 the defendant challenged the admission of an 
interpreter’s statements on hearsay and Confrontation Clause 
grounds.178  In that case, it was not the interpreter, coincidentally 
a law enforcement officer, who testified about the interpreted 
statements, but another law enforcement officer who was present 
during the interpretation.179  There, interestingly, the court 
analyzed the four Nazemian factors while analyzing hearsay, not 
the Confrontation Clause.180  After the court concluded that the 
interpreter’s statements did not constitute inadmissible hearsay, 
the court held that there was no Confrontation Clause issue 
because, using the hearsay analysis, the interpreter’s statements 
belonged to the defendant.181 
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Boskovic182 was much 
more explicit about its conflation of the hearsay rules and the 
Confrontation Clause.  There, the defendant appealed his 
conviction by asserting that his Confrontation Clause rights were 
violated when an interpreter’s statements were admitted.183  The 
Ninth Circuit in that case, in a blatant showing of the conflation, 
stated that if an interpreter is a language conduit, “the 
statements are viewed as the defendant’s own . . . [and] they do 
not constitute inadmissible hearsay and their admission does not 
violate the Confrontation Clause.”184  The Ninth Circuit found the 
interpreter’s statements belonged “to [the defendant] and, as 
party admissions under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2), they 
were not hearsay.  Their admission did not violate the 
175 Id. at 526. 
176 See id. at 528. 
177 681 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2012). 
178 Id. at 959. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. at 959–61. 
181 See id. at 961. 
182 472 F. App’x 607 (9th Cir. 2012). 
183 Id. at 608. 
184 Id. 
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Confrontation Clause.”185  There, the court used its hearsay 
analysis and found that the interpreter’s statements were 
attributable to the defendant.  Thus, the court held that there 
was no Confrontation Clause issue for the same reason. 
Significantly, this conflation is proscribed by the Supreme 
Court’s separation of the law of evidence from the Confrontation 
Clause.  The Supreme Court in Crawford specifically stated that 
“we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth 
Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of 
evidence.”186  Moreover, the Supreme Court rejected the old 
Roberts test, which held that evidence that fell under a firmly-
rooted hearsay exception did not pose a Confrontation Clause 
issue.187  The rejected Roberts test did the same thing that the 
Ninth Circuit is currently doing: conflating the hearsay rules 
with the Confrontation Clause.188  For this reason, the language 
conduit-agency theory is inherently incompatible with the 
Confrontation Clause. 
D. The Language Conduit-Agency Theory Relies on Reliability, 
an Approach Rejected by Crawford and Its Progeny for the 
Confrontation Clause 
As noted above, the language conduit-agency theory uses 
four factors to determine if an interpreter is a language conduit 
or agent of the defendant.189  One of those factors is given little 
significance by courts, and the other three all go toward 
reliability.  Reliability, though, is irrelevant under the 
Confrontation Clause.190  Moreover, even if reliability were an 
acceptable test under the Confrontation Clause, interpreters are 
not reliable to begin with.  Thus, the language conduit-agency 
theory is inherently incompatible with the Confrontation Clause. 
 
185 Id. 
186 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). 
187 See supra Part I.B. 
188 See supra Part I.B. 
189 See supra Part II.A. 
190 See supra Part I.B. 
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1. The Nazemian Factors Are Based on Reliability, Which Is 
Irrelevant Under the Confrontation Clause. 
Even if the Nazemian court were correct in applying the 
language conduit-agency theory to the Confrontation Clause, 
such an application is no longer valid after Crawford and its 
progeny.  As noted above, the language conduit-agency theory 
takes four factors into account when deciding whether an 
interpreter is a language conduit: the party that supplied the 
interpreter; whether the interpreter had a motive to lie; the 
interpreter’s language expertise; and “whether actions 
subsequent to the conversation were consistent with the 
statements as translated.”191  Courts do not give the first factor 
much importance, as the fact that the government provided the 
translator does not necessarily mean that the interpreter cannot 
serve as a language conduit.192  The three latter factors, though, 
all go toward reliability.  However, as noted above, the Supreme 
Court has expressly rejected reliability as a suitable test under 
the Confrontation Clause.193  Since the Nazemian factors go 
toward reliability, the language conduit-agency theory is 
inherently incompatible with the Confrontation Clause. 
The second factor of the language conduit-agency theory, 
whether the interpreter had a motive to lie, has no plausible goal 
other than to ensure the interpreter’s reliability.  Indeed, courts 
have regularly found such a factor to go toward reliability.194  The 
third factor, the interpreter’s language expertise, must also go 
toward reliability.  The whole point of ensuring that the 
interpreter has sufficient training in a language is to ensure that 
the translation is accurate, which bears on reliability.195  Finally, 
the final language conduit factor, whether the defendant’s  
 
 
191 United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012); United 
States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 527 (9th Cir. 1991). 
192 United States v. Romo-Chavez, 681 F.3d 955, 959–60 (9th Cir. 2012); United 
States v. Santacruz, 480 F. App’x 441, 442–43 (9th Cir. 2012); Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 
527–28. 
193 See supra Part I.B. 
194 Boyd v. City of Oakland, 458 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2006); State 
v. Anderson, 733 P.2d 517, 520 (Wash. 1987). 
195 Saavedra v. State, 297 S.W.3d 342, 348–49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see Diaz 
v. State, 743 A.2d 1166, 1182–83 (Del. 1999); State v. Rodriguez, 682 A.2d 764, 769 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996). 
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subsequent actions are consistent with the translation, could only 
serve to reinforce the accuracy of the translation; thus, it goes to 
reliability.196 
But the Supreme Court rejected reliability as an acceptable 
test under the Confrontation Clause.197  Since the language 
conduit factors bear on reliability, the language conduit-agency 
theory is inherently incompatible with the Confrontation Clause. 
2. Interpreters Are Not Necessarily Reliable 
Not only is reliability not an acceptable test under the 
Confrontation Clause, but interpreters are not reliable to begin 
with.  Thus, even if the Confrontation Clause could be satisfied 
by reliability, interpreters’ statements would not meet that 
standard.  Interpreters are not always accurate, and interpreters 
cannot possibly be language conduits because they do not 
translate word-for-word. 
There are a few reasons that could explain why interpreters 
are not always accurate.  First, at least in federal court, there are 
no uniform qualifications for interpreters; instead, they vary from 
district to district, and sometimes from courtroom to 
courtroom.198  In addition, federal courts only administer 
proficiency tests for Spanish interpreters, not interpreters of any 
other language.199  Interpreters could also be unfamiliar with a 
different dialect of a language.200  Moreover, interpreters do not 
translate word-for-word, but instead translate concepts and 
ideas.201  In so doing, interpreters are not language conduits, but 
are using their own judgment in determining what words to use.  
Finally, interpreters can become subject to mental fatigue after 
thirty to forty minutes of interpreting, which results in “a marked 
loss of accuracy.”202 
196 Saavedra, 297 S.W.3d at 348–49. 
197 See supra Part I.B. 
198 Virginia Benmaman & Isabel Framer, Foreign Langauge Interpreters and the 
Judicial System, in, CULTURAL ISSUES IN CRIMINAL DEFENSE 139 (Linda Friedman 
Ramirez ed., 3d ed. 2010). 
199 Id. at 137–38. 
200 See John Eligon, In Court, Lost in Translation, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2011, 
11:55 AM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/lost-in-translation/. 
201 United States v. Charles, 722 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2013); Benmaman & 
Framer, supra note 198, at 163–64. 
202  Benmaman & Framer, supra note 198, at 170–71. 
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As a result, in addition to United States v. Yurofsky,203 there 
are many instances of inaccurate interpreters in the American 
legal system.  In United States v. Santos,204 a magistrate judge 
found that a tape recording had been inaccurately interpreted.205  
The judge found that the transcript of the conversation contained 
“numerous significant omissions and unnecessary additions and 
remarks.”206  In Rodriguez v. State,207 an interpreter was so 
inaccurate that the court instructed the jury as such and brought 
in a new translator.208  In Ouanbenboune v. State,209 a murder 
case, the court held that the trial interpreter’s “inaccuracies did 
fundamentally alter the context of [the defendant’s] testimony.”210  
In Ponce v. State,211 as a trial judge was advising a defendant of 
the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, an interpreter was 
translating that colloquy for the defendant.212  But the 
translation was so inaccurate that defendant did not know what 
rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, so the defendant’s 
guilty plea was vacated because he did not waive his rights 
knowingly and intelligently.213 In People v. Cabrera,214 the 
interpreter at trial was so inaccurate that some of the jurors, 
during deliberations, noted the inaccuracies and provided a 
different translation for the entire jury.215  The list goes on and 
on, but the point is clear:  Mistakes happen during translations. 
The most effective way to discover these mistakes would be 
through cross-examination, the only remedy that the 
Confrontation Clause provides. 
 
203 148 F. Supp. 2d 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 55 F. App’x 13 (2d Cir. 2002); see 
supra Introduction. 
204 No. 92-289(RLA), 1993 WL 278557 (D.P.R. 1993). 
205 Id. at *1. 
206 Id. 
207 518 S.E.2d 131 (Ga. 1999). 
208 Id. at 136. 
209 220 P.3d 1122 (Nev. 2009). 
210 Id. at 1125. 
211 9 N.E.3d 1265 (Ind. 2014). 
212 Id. at 1271. 
213 Id. at 1271–72, 1274. 
214 281 Cal. Rptr. 238 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
215 Id. at 242. 
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IV. A SOLUTION 
Obtaining for trial the same interpreter from an 
interrogation could be a difficult task for the prosecutor; after all, 
a trial can take place a year or more after an interrogation, and 
people die, move, become ill, or otherwise become unreachable.  
But there is a simple solution here.  The problem with the 
language conduit-agency theory only arises if the prosecutor 
wants to use the interpreter’s statements from an interrogation 
at trial.  There is no Confrontation Clause issue if the defendant’s 
own statements, as opposed to the interpreter’s statements, are 
admitted.216  Thus, whenever an interpreter is needed at an 
interrogation, the prosecutor or law enforcement official could 
record it.  Whether it is a video or only an audio recording is 
unimportant, as long as the interrogation is audible.  Before trial, 
the prosecutor would eliminate the interpreter’s statements and 
only keep the defendant’s statements in his native language and 
the interrogator’s questions.217  At trial, the prosecutor would 
have an interpreter, and not necessarily the same interpreter 
from the interrogation, translate the defendant’s statements from 
the interrogation.  That translator would be on the stand, so 
216 See United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1358–59 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that admission of the defendant’s own statement did not violate 
Confrontation Clause); United States v. Zizzo, 120 F.3d 1338, 1354 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(noting that a defendant’s own statements “obviously pose no problem” under the 
Confrontation Clause). 
217 The interrogator’s questions would be admissible at trial. In order to 
constitute hearsay, the statement or conduct in question must be an assertion, FED. 
R. EVID. 801(a), and questions are not hearsay because they are not assertions. 
United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 84 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that “as a matter of 
law, questions are not ‘assertions’ within the meaning of Rule 801” and are therefore 
not hearsay); United States v. Wright, 343 F.3d 849, 865 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[A] 
question is typically not hearsay because it does not assert the truth or falsity of a 
fact.”). Without any assertions, questions cannot be offered for their truth, so they 
are not hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c)(2). People v. Gholam, 99 
A.D.3d 441, 443, 951 N.Y.S.2d 526, 528 (4th Dep’t 2012) (holding, under New York 
law, that “[q]uestions themselves are not hearsay because they are not offered for 
their truth”). Additionally, questions are not testimonial under the Confrontation 
Clause because questions cannot “establish or prove past events potentially relevant 
to later criminal prosecution.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006); see 
also United States v. Johnson, No. 3:14-CR-02, 2014 WL 3954998, at *10 (N.D.W. 
Va. Aug. 13, 2014) (noting that questions are not testimonial under Confrontation 
Clause); Davenport v. Davis, No. 07-12047, 2009 WL 960411, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 
7, 2009) (rejecting, in habeas corpus proceeding, the Confrontation Clause claim 
because “the victim did not answer any of [the officer’s] questions; thus, there were 
no testimonial statements made by the victim to the officer”). Thus, the 
interrogator’s questions would be admissible. 
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defense counsel could cross-examine him.  Because that 
translator’s interpretation would be the only one shown to the 
jury, the Confrontation Clause would be satisfied.  There would 
not even be any issues with surrogate testimony because the 
same interpreter who did the translation shown to the jury would 
be subject to cross-examination.218  Thus, the solution for 
prosecutors to the flaws in the language conduit-agency theory is 
for the prosecutor to introduce a recording of the interrogation, 
excise the interpreter’s statements from that recording, and have 
a new interpreter at trial translate the defendant’s statements. 
CONCLUSION 
There is only one way to satisfy the Confrontation Clause: 
calling the witness to the stand so the defendant can cross-
examine him.  That rule should be substituted for the language 
conduit-agency theory when applied to interpreted statements of 
a defendant from a police interrogation because the language 
conduit-agency theory is inherently incompatible with the 
Confrontation Clause.  The language conduit-agency theory’s 
imputation of an interpreter’s statements to the defendant comes 
from the hearsay rules and has no basis in the Confrontation 
Clause.  Its use of an agency relationship has no basis in agency 
law.  It ignores the reality that interpreters make mistakes and 
are not always accurate.  If the government wants to introduce 
interpreted statements of a defendant from a police 
interrogation, then the government should have to call the 
interpreter to the stand.  Subjecting the interpreter to the 
Confrontation Clause is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence in Crawford and its progeny.  Interpreters, like all 
other purveyors of testimonial statements, should be subject to 
the “crucible of cross-examination.”219 
 
218 See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2718 (2011) (stating that the 
prosecution could have avoided a Confrontation Clause issue involving surrogate 
testimony by having the analyst who testified at trial redo the blood test himself 
instead of having him testify about a blood test that he did not conduct). 
219 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). 
